o remarcă foarte kolhoznică - Europî vă trebui? la prăşît mai ghine!

Totuşi, lasă să se ducă, şi nu cred că cheltuie chiar aşa de mult. Poate nu obţine nimic concret, dar încearcă. Nu uita, de fiecare dată li se aminteşte politicos despre imigranţi, prostituate...

__________________
Vorbele dezbină faptele unesc

Aha, dacă ai şti ce impresie fac ei în Vest cu comportamentul lor "made in USSR". Şi nu cred că are vreun efect faptul că li se spune "politicos". spiKiriţa noastră s-a săturat de monitorizarea APCE, de exemplu, iar Stratan in interviul de la BBC spune foarte răspicat că România e de vină de impasul din relaţiile dintre rm şi România. Iar după asta, foarte senin, spune că se va duce la Bucureşti să discute "momente" cu Mircea Geoană. Şi omul e diplomat, adică... :roll:

Şi despre ce altceva ar trebui să li se amintească? Despre politica ultrarusopupincuristă, incompatibilă cu autodeclarata intenţie de integrare în UE?

No End in Sight

There are few hopes that Moldova’s bitter 13-year conflict with its breakaway Slav region can be resolved in the near future.

By IWPR contributors in Chisinau, Tiraspol and Bucharest (BCR No 524, 03-Nov-04)

The Republic of Moldova, a tiny nation sandwiched between Romania and Ukraine, has struggled to cope with the independence it gained when the Soviet Union dissolved in 1991.

Since then, it has gone from being the “breadbasket and vineyard” of the former superpower to the poorest country in Europe, where 80 per cent of the 4.4 million-strong population lives below the poverty line.

Aside from whispers of corruption and worries over criminal activities such as people-trafficking, the EU also views Moldova with concern because the government there has had no control over 11 per cent of its territory for nearly 14 years.

The breakaway republic of Transdniester, a sliver of land on the eastern, left bank of the river Dniester close to Moldova’s official border with Ukraine, declared independence from the then Soviet republic in 1990 and has remained defiantly separatist ever since.

Around 1,600 Russian troops and 20,000 tonnes of weaponry – the remnants of the Soviet 14th Army – act as a security and police force in Transdniester, which has retained its close links to Moscow.

No government or embassy recognises this breakaway nation, which is now notorious as a haven for those who would traffic people, guns and drugs across the often-porous borders of the former Soviet republics.

Before the Second World War, most of what is now the Moldovan state was part of Romania, but the land was then annexed by the Soviet Union.

In the late Eighties, the largely Russian and Ukrainian population east of the Dniester – who traditionally feel closer to Moscow than to the Moldovan capital Chisinau – grew increasingly concerned that the central government wanted the republic to join Romania.

The adoption of a law naming Moldovan – a language virtually identical to Romanian – as the official state language in 1989 intensified these fears. It prompted Russian-speaking officals across the Dniester to set up their own administration in the city of Tiraspol and declare the area independent.

A short but bloody conflict followed in 1992, resulting in the deaths of more than 700 people in the six months before Russian troops intervened to bring fighting to a close.

Twelve years on, opinions are still bitterly divided as to the root cause of the problems – leaving little hope that the situation can be normalised and the country reunited.

Moldova’s deputy minister for reunification, Victor Postolache, said, "The conflict started because of the desire of a group of former Soviet officials to keep control over Transdniester, a region that should be used as a gateway to the whole Balkan region."

Ilie Ilascu, a former political prisoner who spent nine years in jail in Tiraspol after the conflict, agrees with this assessment. "Russian geopolitical interests were the only source of the war in this region," he told IWPR.

But politicians and analysts on the other side of the river dismiss these claims, insisting that Moldova’s desire to rejoin Romania left them with little choice but to protect the interests of the Russian-speaking community.

Grigory Volovoi, a former Transdniester politician who now works as a journalist, said, "The initial reaction of our leaders to the adoption of the 1989 language law was to demand its amendment, and when this failed, to insist that a free economic zone to be created in the region.

“When these requests were rejected and certain threats followed, a referendum for the region’s independence was organised and a new kind of state was created.”

Five years after the breakaway republic declared its independence - and following intense mediation by the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe, OSCE, involving Russia and Ukraine – Chisinau and Tiraspol finally produced a “memorandum of understanding”, which guaranteed a certain amount of autonomy for the region.

This was followed by an agreement signed at an OSCE summit in Istanbul in 1999, during which Russia agreed to end its military presence in the region by the end of 2002. As yet, no timetable for this withdrawal has been established, in spite of the OSCE putting aside 30 million US dollars to help finance it.

In the meantime, plans to deploy an OSCE peacekeeping force have met with considerable resistance in Tiraspol. "If such steps are taken, it would lead to a new outbreak of conflict - including an armed one," Transdniester’s deputy security minister Oleg Gudymo warned recently.

Hopes for a peaceful solution were raised in November 2003, with a proposal drafted by Moscow which envisaged turning Moldova into a federation in which Transdniester would retain its governing and legislative bodies, including control of its own budget and fiscal policy, and would have its own language laws.

Moldovan president Vladimir Voronin, after initially making positive noises about the proposal, went on to reject it following widespread opposition in Chisinau to what was seen as a plan to undermine the sovereignty of the state.

The idea of federalism is viewed with suspicion in the breakaway republic, too.

"Most people [here] are totally against any kind of federal union with Moldova, but they are also aware that economic cooperation between the two sides is still necessary," said Sergey Ilchenko, senior editor of the Dnestrovsky Kurier daily.

Grigory Marakutsa, speaker of the Transdniestrian parliament, said that local officials were still discussing the construction of a common state, in line with the wishes of the international community. “But more and more voices [here] say that these negotiations are useless as it will soon be quite possible to build a totally independent state outside Moldova," he said at a recent press conference.

The republic’s foreign affairs committee announced earlier this month that a new referendum – where citizens would be asked to choose between continued negotiations with Moldova on federalisation, or consolidating independent status – was in the planning stages, although there was no mention of when this plebiscite would be held.

Observers familiar with conditions in Transdniester doubt such a referendum would be credible.

"There is no democratically elected government and those who want to express their political opinions are afraid, as dissidents are followed by the political police," said one Russian-speaking journalist, who spoke to IWPR on condition of anonymity.

Across the river in the rest of the country, where the majority of the population is of Moldovan origin, the idea of an independent Trandniester fills many with unease.

Stefan Jurja, a former soldier who fought for Moldova during the 1992 conflict, said, "People [in Transdniester] have to put a stop to their aggressive politics and illegitimate actions. Unfortunately, I am afraid that Russia will ultimately succeed in imposing its views in favour of an independent Transdniester."

Relations between Chisinau and Tiraspol were further strained in summer 2004 following Transdniester’s decision to close down schools and kindergartens that taught the Moldovan language using the Latin script. Transdniester has retained the Soviet-era Cyrillic alphabet that was designed to differentiate the language from Romanian, while Moldova has switched to Latin letters.

The heavy-handed school closures outraged the international community, which slammed the decision as “linguistic cleansing”.

This row largely went over the heads of the population on both sides of the river, who had more pressing things to worry about.

"Many citizens have no opinion on the conflict because of poverty,” said Oazu Nantoi from the Institute for Public Policies in Chisinau. “They are looking first of all to their own urgent economical and personal needs, and to the country’s problems after that.

“One survey asked Moldovans how they saw prospects for federalisation, and 80 per cent of those polled replied that they didn't know anything about it and had no opinion either way."

Under such conditions, analysts believe that the only possible solution will involve a continuation of the dialogue between Chisinau and Tiraspol, under close international supervision.

"Russia, Ukraine, the EU, and the United States have to find a common stance on the issue of Moldovan federalisation, and organise a meeting between Moldovan and Transdniestran leaders in order to overcome the political crisis," said Andrei Safonov, a political analyst in Transdniester. "There is no other solution if Moldova is to become a stable and prosperous country at the EU's borders."

Moldovan president Vladimir Voronin remains defiant, but concedes that any resolution to this long-running and damaging conflict will ultimately depend on the international community – particularly Moscow.

"The Transdniester regime is and will remain a puppet ruled by Russia and Ukraine," said Voronin recently. "But I will never allow this region – this huge, black and corrupt morasse - to get away."

http://www.iwpr.net/index.pl?archive..._524_2_eng.txt

EURASIA DAILY MONITOR
Volume 1 Issue 120 (November 04, 2004)
OSCE'S YEAR-END CONFERENCE SET TO CONDONE RUSSIA'S FORCES IN MOLDOVA
By Vladimir Socor

Next to Georgia, Moldova has ranked near the top of the European diplomatic and security agenda for the last three years. Officially, the OSCE handles the issues of conflict-settlement and Russian forces in Moldova. Nevertheless, the OSCE has now decided to exclude the issue of Russia's unlawful military presence in Moldova and Georgia from the agenda and documents of the OSCE's upcoming year-end conference in Sofia (on Georgia, see EDM, November 1).

In consultations at the OSCE Permanent Council ahead of the year-end conference, Russia has rejected all Moldovan, Georgian, and Western suggestions about including a reference to Russia's 1999 OSCE Commitments in the 2004 year-end meeting's Political Declaration and "regional statements." With regard to Moldova, the 1999 Commitments required Russia to withdraw its forces in two stages in 2001 and 2002. Russia, however, has repudiated those Commitments. In the run-up to the OSCE's 2004 year-end conference, Russian officials are openly stating that Russia will keep its forces in Moldova indefinitely.

Consequently, Russia now goes farther than ruling out a hypothetical OSCE admonition from the year-end documents (the OSCE would not take that risk in the first place). What Russia rules out is a simple factual reference to the 1999 documents. The OSCE is going along for three main reasons: First, Russia threatens to block the adoption of the organization's 2005 budget. Second, the OSCE itself prefers by now to drop the issue, rather than lose face in futile attempts year after year to remind Russia of its unfulfilled obligations. And, third -- ultimately a decisive factor -- the U.S. State Department and the European Union have made a political decision to give in to Russia at this conference for the sake of "saving" the OSCE and having a "successful" year-end conference. Such an approach might perhaps be defensible, if the issue of Russia's military seizure of part of Moldova (and parts of Georgia) were discussed effectively in some other channels and forums. However, this is not the case, mainly because the U.S. and EU have not seriously tried to make it happen, while NATO refuses to discuss these issues in the NATO-Russia Council.

The 1999 Commitments had stipulated that Russia would withdraw its forces from Moldova by the 2001-2002 deadlines completely, unconditionally, and under international monitoring. However, the OSCE -- and the United States and EU within the OSCE -- went along with Russia in eviscerating those commitments at the organization's successive year-end conferences.

The December 2002 Porto conference postponed the troop-withdrawal deadline; rephrased Russia's unconditional troop-withdrawal obligation into a mere "intention"' and inserted a vaguely-worded conditionality -- "provided the necessary conditions are in place" -- that Russia continues to exploit. Russia demanded these changes at that conference; Moldova courageously resisted; U.S. Assistant Secretary of State Elizabeth Jones agreed in a separate room with the Russian delegation on those changes, then cajoled Moldova into accepting them. The scene took place in full view of conference participants and forms part of the OSCE's internal institutional memory. Moldova yielded to U.S. -- not Russian -- pressure in that fateful instance. The alignment at Porto reflected the State Department's 2002-2004 support for Russia's conflict-settlement project of a Russian-"guaranteed" Moldova/Trans-Dniester "federation."

The OSCE's December 2003 Maastricht conference compounded the damage by failing to stipulate -- in effect, lifting -- any deadline on Russian troop withdrawal. Predicting that Russia would breach any new deadline down the road, Western governments decided to give up in order to "avoid a loss of face by the OSCE." Even so, the Maastricht conference was unable to issue any final Political Declaration or regional statements because Russia ruled out even an innocuous reference to the 1999 Commitments on troop-withdrawal from Moldova and Georgia. The United States and EU decided that renouncing those documents altogether was preferable to issuing meaningless documents. Thus, Maastricht preserved at least a residue of OSCE integrity.

That residue may be lost at the December 2004 Sofia conference if the United States, EU, and the Bulgarian 2004 Chairmanship decide to drop from the conference agenda the issue of Russian troop withdrawal from Moldova and Georgia. In Moldova's case, that issue includes not only Russian-flagged, but also the Trans-Dniester-flagged forces, which consist of personnel and weaponry (including types banned in Moldova by the 1999-adapted CFE Treaty) that Russia's forces transferred to Trans-Dniester's forces. Unable to deal with this issue, the OSCE's American-led Moldova Mission now proposes to legalize Trans-Dniester's forces on a par with the army of rump Moldova in a "federation." That same Mission, along with Paris and Berlin, would allow Russian "peacekeeping" troops to stay in Moldova, despite the 1999 Commitments that stipulated the complete withdrawal of Russian forces. Thus, making exceptions for Trans-Dniester-flagged forces and for Russian "peacekeepers" would complete the evisceration of the 1999 Commitments.

Meanwhile, Washington and NATO continue to declare that Russia's fulfillment of the 1999 Commitments is a condition to Western ratification of the 1999-adapted Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe. The linkage is well-founded and necessary, but is a weak and insufficient argument because the 1999 Commitments are in shreds by now; Moscow openly scoffs at their invocation by the West; the United States and EU are not raising the issue consistently or at the requisite levels with Russia; and some governments, including the German and French, seem inclined to proceed with CFE ratification irrespective of Russia's ongoing breaches of the 1999 Istanbul Commitments and indeed of the terms of CFE itself.

http://www.jamestown.org/publication...cle_id=2368800

http://www1.azi.md/news?ID=31566

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Membrii Comitetului de Ministri al Consiliului Europei, inclusiv Rusia, au condamnat actiunile autoritatilor transnistrene
4 noiembrie 2004
Versiune pentru tipar



Comitetul de Ministri (CM) al Consiliului Europei (CE) este profund ingrijorat de faptul ca scolile moldovenesti cu predare in baza grafiei latine din regiunea transnistreana a Republicii Moldova se confrunta cu grave dificultati de la inceputul acestui an scolar din cauza masurilor intreprinse de liderii locali. Folosirea copiilor in calitate de unelte in atingerea scopurilor politice este complet inacceptabila din punct de vedere uman, se arata intr-o declaratie a acestei organizatii.
In declaratie se arata ca membrii Comitetului de Ministri, inclusiv reprezentantii Federatiei Ruse, sustin eforturile lui Gil Robles, Comisarul Consiliului Europei pentru drepturile omului, a ministrului Afacerilor Externe al Norvegiei Ian Petersen, ce detine presedintia in CM, si apreciaza pozitiv eforturile mediatorilor in conflictul transnistrean: Federatia Rusa, Ucraina si OSCE si a reprezentantului special al secretarului general al Consiliului Europei. Comitetul de Ministri cere identificarea unei solutii definitive a problemei scolilor in concordanta cu standardele Consiliului Europei.

In acest scop, Comitetul de Ministri isi exprima disponibilitatea de a acorda asistenta in toate domeniile ce tin de competenta Consiliului Europei.-0-
http://www1.azi.md/news?ID=31590

Protestele reprezentantilor scolilor romanesti din Transnistria impotriva politicii Federatiei Ruse vor avea o alta forma
23 noiembrie 2004
Versiune pentru tipar



Desi au pichetat marti, 23 noiembrie, Ambasada rusa la Chisinau, reprezentantii Liceului "Evrica" din Rabnita considera totusi ca "acest gen de protest, pichetarea, trebuie inlocuit cu o alta forma". De aceiasi parere sunt si reprezentantii Comitetului Helsinki Moldova, care au propus "incetarea pichetarii Ambasadei Rusiei din cauza ineficacitatii acestei forme de protest".
Directorul adjunct al Liceului "Evrica" din Rabnita Galina Ticovshi a declarat marti pentru AP FLUX ca "nu crede ca protestele impotriva Federatiei Ruse trebuiesc incetate", dar "crede ca acestea trebuie sa se desfasoare intr-o alta forma, deoarece pichetarea zilnica a ambasadei nu da nici un rezultat". "Daca protestele vor inceta definitiv, o sa ramanem in umbra si toti vor uita de noi, crezand ca problema este rezolvata. Trebuie sa organizam niste manifestatii de protest, dar de o amploare mai mare decat pichetarea ambasadei ruse", a conchis Ticovschi.

Presedintele Comitetului parintilor elevilor din Liceul "Evrica" Alexei Catana a declarat la randul sau ca este nevoie de "alte actiuni de protest, de o mai mare amploare". "Faptul ca noi pichetam zilnic ambasada rusa nu cred ca ii deranjeaza pe responsabilii din interior, dar mite pe oficialitatile Rusiei. Cand am discutat vara aceasta cu consilierul Ambasadei ruse Oleg Astahov, am inteles ca el nu ne intelege si ca este de partea separatistilor", a conchis Catana.

Mai mult, potrivit directorului Liceului "Evrica" Eugenia Halus, chiar de la inceputul protestelor in fata Ambasadei ruse (3 noiembrie), credea ca "acestea nu vor avea nici un efect, deoarece nimeni nu atrage atentie faptului ca elevii si parintii acestora stau in strada". "Vedem ca problemele noastre nu sunt solutionate prin asemenea metode. Am venit totusi in fata ambasadei fiindca noi, pedagogii, elevii si parintii, nu dispunem de alte parghii de solutionare a problemei", a subliniat ea.

In alt context, Halus a declarat ca "separatistii o obliga sa ceara schimbarea adresei juridice a liceului in certificatul de inregistrare". "Ei cer sa ne dezicem de cladirea noastra, constructia careia a fost stopata de separatisti in iulie curent, in favoarea cladirii pe care o arendam in prezent. In caz contrar vom fi dati in judecata. Am informat Ministerul Educatiei despre cerinta Tiraspolului, dar responsabilii din cadrul lui nu au putut sa ne propuna o solutie. De fapt, nici nu am fost inregistrati oficial la Tiraspol. Am primit o hartie care nu inseamna nimic, deoarece nu am fost inscrisi in registru. Din aceasta cauza nu ne putem conecta la reteaua telefonica. Pentru aceasta trebuie sa prezentam extrasul din registru. Ministerul Educatiei tace si in acest caz", a conchis ea.

Unul dintre organizatorii pichetarii ambasadei ruse, avocatul Veaceslav Turcan, considera ca "acum este necesar de organizat alte actiuni publice, spre exemplu niste marsuri de protest". "Nu trebuie sa renuntam la proteste, ci sa le dam o forma mai eficienta, pentru a aminti in permanenta conducerii Rusiei ca drepturile copiilor din Transnistria sunt incalcate. Noi nu cedam in nici un caz. Schimbam doar forma", a conchis Turcan.

Miercuri, la pichetarea Ambasadei Federatiei Ruse vor participa reprezentantii tuturor scolilor romanesti din Transnistria.

FLUX
http://www.azi.md/news?ID=31863

Ce idiotzi! Cu asa idei o sa pierdem Transnistria sau nu se va rezolva nimic!........Idiotzi....

A innebunit cu totul Vestul....... Parca am vorbi cu Rusii, nu cu Occidentalii...... :-?